Despite a dramatic Supreme Court ruling that invalidated many of former President Donald Trump's sweeping tariff actions, the White House is far from out of options in continuing its economic campaign against foreign trade practices.
At his press conference Friday, Trump noted Justice Brett Kavanaugh's dissenting opinion found that Trump cannot be "substantially restrained" from imposing tariffs.
In a decision issued Friday, the high court held that Trump overstepped his authority by using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose broad tariffs on imports — a legal blow to one of the most ambitious uses of executive power in modern U.S. trade policy.
But legal experts and administration officials alike say the president still has multiple statutory avenues to impose duties on foreign goods.
The ruling does not eliminate all presidential tariff authority, Kavanaugh noted in his dissent.
In fact, he enumerated several alternative trade statutes that the administration can exploit, and he bluntly predicted that "the Court's decision is not likely to greatly restrict Presidential tariff authority going forward."
This comes alongside comments from U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, who told reporters before the decision that "Congress appropriately has delegated a lot of tariff authority to the President of the United States," leaving ample room for future actions.
The Supreme Court's majority found that the IEEPA — a 1977 law intended to give the president emergency powers to regulate commerce during national emergencies — does not include a clear delegation to impose taxes or duties on imports.
Tariffs, the court said, are forms of taxation that the Constitution vests primarily in Congress.
The decision, Learning Resources v. Trump, consolidated challenges from importers and states who argued Trump's "liberation day" tariffs exceeded his legal authority, and the court upheld lower court findings that IEEPA did not cover the tariffs at issue.
Nevertheless, legal analysts say that a suite of other trade laws offers fallback mechanisms that Trump can use to impose new levies, though each has its own limits and requirements.
Section 232: National Security Tariffs
One of the most prominent alternatives is Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the president to impose tariffs on imports that are found to threaten U.S. national security. This authority has already been used to justify duties on steel, aluminum, autos and other products.
Section 232 requires a Commerce Department investigation into whether specific imports impair national security — a process that by law can take up to 270 days, after which the president may act.
Because of this built-in investigative timeline, Section 232 is less nimble than the now-invalidated IEEPA approach, but it is legally solid and could be applied more broadly or to new categories of goods. Already, roughly 10% of U.S. imports are subjected to Section 232 tariffs.
Section 301: Trade Practices Tariffs
Another key tool is Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which authorizes the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate foreign trade practices and, if it finds them unfair or discriminatory, impose duties in response. Trump previously used Section 301 extensively to impose steep tariffs on goods from China related to intellectual property and market access disputes.
Section 301 requires a formal investigation, public notice, and opportunity for comment, making it slower and more targeted than Trump's former IEEPA regime. But because Section 301 is aimed at specific foreign conduct — such as violations of trade agreements — it is legally robust and less vulnerable to constitutional challenges than emergency powers arguments.
Section 122: Balance-of-Payments Tariffs
A lesser-used authority is Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, which permits the president to impose temporary global tariffs (up to 15%) to address "large and serious" balance-of-payments deficits — a concern linked to trade imbalances that Trump frequently cited. These tariffs can only stay in place for 150 days unless Congress acts to extend them, and the statute has never been invoked by a president.
While untested at the presidential level, Section 122 could temporarily replicate the broad base of a global tariff, albeit at lower rates and with built-in time limits.
Section 338: Addressing Discrimination
A more obscure tool in the tariff toolbox is Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which allows duties if another country "uniquely discriminates" against the U.S. This provision has rarely been used, but Trump's trade team reportedly looked at Section 338 as a fallback option ahead of the Supreme Court fight.
Section 338 could be invoked if American products face discriminatory barriers abroad — a flexible but potentially limited basis for imposing additional tariffs.
While these authorities give Trump a path forward, they cannot fully replicate the breadth and speed of the IEEPA tariff regime.
Each requires investigations, findings, or statutory triggers that take time and can be legally contested. And any action under these provisions, too, could face court challenges — potentially from the same importers and trade groups that brought successful litigation against the IEEPA tariffs.
Still, the administration's trade apparatus appears poised to pivot quickly.
With tariffs collected under IEEPA now thrown into legal uncertainty — potentially leaving billions in refunds at stake for U.S. businesses — Washington's focus is shifting to statute-based authorities that offer clearer congressional backing and judicial defensibility.
As the next round of investigations and notices unfold, the contours of U.S. trade policy will remain in flux — even as Trump seeks to maintain pressure on foreign competitors. In the wake of the Supreme Court setback, the long game of tariff politics is far from over.
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