U.N. Promoted Annan Despite Endless Gaffes

Andrew Li-Yan Hsia, an official of the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office in New York, had intended to speak with U.N. reporters on Taipei's response to the SARS crisis. He was to meet the U.N. press at the U.N. Correspondents Club in the high-rise Secretariat building Friday.

According to UNCA president Tony Jenkins, earlier in the week, Annan had given assurances that Hsia would be allowed to speak at the U.N., despite a history of Beijing's U.N. mission opposing such access.

Then, says Jenkins, on Thursday evening Annan reversed himself. When Hsia attempted to enter the U.N. on Friday he was blocked at the entrance by an armed security officer acting under orders from the U.N. chief.

Annan spokesman Fred Eckhard would say only that the U.N. General Assembly "has a firm one China policy."

Though considered by many observers to "be diplomatically savvy," history shows that Annan commonly stumbles on his own words.

In the months leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Annan repeatedly told reporters that the coalition did not have U.N. approval to use force. As such, any military action "would not be legal." Annan insisted that a second Security Council resolution to launch an invasion of Iraq was necessary.

Washington and London disagreed. On March 19, Operation Iraqi Freedom began.

Kofi Annan went silent.

Several weeks earlier, a British newspaper (the Times) reported about a document that centered on U.N. contingency planning in the event the U.S. and U.K. invaded Iraq.

Annan publicly challenged the Times' report. The secretary-general insisted no such document existed.

Just hours later, Annan asked the Times' reporter how he got his hands on the document. When the reporter reminded the U.N. chief that he had earlier denied such a document existed, Annan smiled, shook his finger, and walked away.

In March and April of 2002, Annan clashed with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

The reason: Numerous reports were broadcast and printed about Israeli soldiers allegedly massacring "hundreds" of Palestinian civilians in the West Bank town of Jenin. Israel denied the reports.

After consulting with Peres and Palestinian President Yassir Arafat, Annan announced early that April that he had permission from all parties to launch a fact-finding investigation.

Then came the controversy.

In mid-April, Annan announced that a formal commission of inquiry would travel to the region to investigate the charges made against the Israeli military.

Shimon Peres said no. He insisted that he and Annan had agreed only to a small, informal group to investigate specific charges.

The foreign minister said that Israel had no interest in hosting a formal commission of inquiry. He also said that he had never agreed to work with such a body.

Annan disagreed. The dispute on just what was agreed to simmered for several days.

Then it became known that Annan had his telephone call with Peres secretly taped.

Israel's deputy U.N. ambassador Aaron Jacob said that Jerusalem would not object to a release of the Annan tape or a written transcript of the conversation being made public.

When Annan was asked if he would release the tape of the Peres telephone call, he replied, "To you, the press, never."

Annan claimed that the privacy of such high-level communications was "sacrosanct."

However, the U.N. chief seemed to forget that several weeks earlier he leaked the contents of a personal letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon before it had been replied to. That brought a rare public rebuke by Israel's U.N. mission.

Annan's actions were officially called "inappropriate and contrary to basic diplomatic conduct."

He eventually dropped the fact-finding idea, and never sent anyone to Jenin.

The U.N. did manage to issue a report on the incident in August 2002. In it, the U.N. was forced to admit that it could verify only the deaths of 52 Palestinians, not the rumors of more than 500 fatalities originally claimed.

In February 1998, Annan traveled to Baghdad to see Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The mission to Iraq came about as U.N. arms inspectors complained about the lack of cooperation in their hunt for weapons of mass destruction.

The secretary-general left the Iraqi capital telling reporters Saddam "is a man I can do business with."

Annan had just concluded the infamous Memorandum of Understanding. The "MOU" laid out the ground rules for U.N. inspections of so-called "sensitive" and "presidential" sites.

By December, the MOU had all but fallen apart. Annan pulled the U.N. personnel out of Iraq.

The Clinton administration then launched Operation Desert Fox. Annan saw his deal with Saddam Hussein explode in the night skies over Baghdad.

It was not the first time Annan had problems with military confrontations.

In 1993, Annan was the under secretary-general in charge of the U.N.'s department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO). At that time, the U.N. and the U.S. were heavily involved in trying to bring order to war-torn Somalia.

In October 1993, the U.S. in conjunction with DPKO launched a series of daring raids in the Somali capital, Mogadishu. The purpose was to capture Mohammed Farah Aidid, a notorious warlord who controlled rebels that had been striking U.N. and U.S. forces.

Part of the operation was immortalized in the motion picture "Black Hawk Down."

As one attack got under way under cover of darkness, CNN began a live broadcast from the scene. The cable network televised images of U.S. helicopters dropping assault troops onto the roofs of several homes in the city. Gunfire and explosions could be seen and heard.

Press calls to the Pentagon were referred to U.N. headquarters in New York.

Washington insisted that any Somali military operation was under U.N., not U.S., control. U.N. spokesman Joe Sills therefore decided to make the head of U.N. peacekeeping available to the press.

It was Kofi Annan.

Annan told reporters assembled in Sills' office that he "could not confirm reports of any military operation," and that "everything was quiet" in Mogadishu.

The U.N. military chief had a problem. Sitting right beside him was a television with CNN showing an attack in progress. The gaffe was recorded by several radio and television networks.

Annan returned later in the evening to confirm the military operation.

He explained his earlier denials by claiming that the Pentagon had not given him "clearance" to speak about the Somali raid.

Many U.N. diplomats feel that Annan won a second five-year term in 2001 simply because he was able to outmaneuver a weak field of potential alternatives.

One of his campaign lieutenants, Shashi Tharoor (India) was once labeled by former U.N. chief arms inspector Richard Butler as "captain of [Annan's] thought police."

Tharoor, now the director of the U.N.'s Department of Public Information, is believed to be eyeing the world body's top job when Annan retires in 2006.

Speaking about Annan and his controversial dealings, one French diplomat remarked: "He's your man ... You [the U.S.] wanted him ... so do not complain."