Orban's Defeat Adversely Impacts Conservatism Globally

Last week marked an electoral defeat of Viktor Orban, an iconic prime minister of Hungary, after 16 years in office.

Orban was an international symbol of populist conservatism, thus generating great interest in the world but particularly in Brussels, Moscow, and Washington.

He lost to his former party colleague, Peter Magyar 54 to 38%, but due to the political system, it translated into a 138 to 55 electoral supermajority.

The most important aspect of Orban's defeat is symbolic.

Since he was an ideological champion for national conservatism, his loss impacts similar movements around the world and raises doubts about their future.

But he lays to rest his ideological opponents’ accusations that he was an autocrat.

The election proceeded as planned and he conceded his loss gracefully.

Peter Magyar campaigned on two main domestic issues: a stagnant economy and high inflation that never recovered from COVID-19, and Orban who purportedly directed all his initiatives at his own friends and supporters.

The resultant melding of politics and business engendered resentment in many who perceived what they witnessed as crony capitalism.

Magyar also campaigned as a conservative, following Orban's social policies in his opposition to illegal migration, green new deal or gender politics.

Significantly, despite this, leftist parties and post-communists in Hungary have been wiped out. None are represented in the new Parliament, which consists of Magyar's Tisza party, Orban's Fidesz, and a small right wing party Movement for Homeland.

Other Orban policies, such as toward Ukraine and Russia also will likely be followed as they are based on structural factors.

Due to communist policies, Hungary is almost totally dependent on Russian oil and gas, therefore necessitating pragmatic policies toward Russia.

With Ukraine, its government is treating a local Hungarian minority badly, leading to increasing strife.

Further, Zelensky's progressivism clashes with Orban's conservatism, making this conflict personal. The biggest ideological difference between two rivals is the attitude toward the European Union (EU).

Orban was a sceptic and opposed numerous EU initiatives encroaching on national sovereignty or promoted progressive values.

Magyar is the opposite, very positive toward the EU, partly out of conviction, partly because Hungary badly needs tens of billions of dollars in withheld EU funds to get the economy out of recession.

The European Union did everything possible for Magyar's victory. Aside from withholding enormous funds for ideological reasons, it gave propaganda support through its international media, the leftist NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and foundations, and even secret services.

Now it expects payback from Magyar’s with 27 concrete actions to reverse Orban's legacy. First, it expects lifting of Hungarian veto on 90 billion euros loan to Ukraine, on sanctions against Russia, and on Ukraine’s membership application to the EU.

Then, it expects Magyar to methodically dismantle the Orban political system and remove his appointees from office.

It wants Hungary to adopt the euro.

Most significantly, the European Union and Germany, its most important player, want Magyar to agree to remove veto power that every EU member state has over major decisions, to be replaced by the EU qualified majority, dominated by Germany.

Germany has the ambition to achieve the superpower status and be a mediator between the United States and Russia.

It already is doing everything possible to achieve European "strategic autonomy" and to exclude the United States from the transatlantic alliance.

Then it would be in a position to strike a deal with Russia, as it did numerous times in the last 300 years, usually at the expense of the rest of Europe, and establish its own historical brand of authoritarian politics.

But victorious Magyar chose Warsaw for his first state visit to rebuild Hungary's relations with Poland.

Poland and Hungary have been friends for 1000 years, have common kings and queens, and have a similar gentry culture.

But under Orban, there was a significant geopolitical difference between the two in regard to Russia and Ukraine.

Poland perceives Russia as a threat and diversified away its energy supplies completely, depending among other things, on the US LNG.

For Poland, Ukraine is regarded as a strategic partner, and issues of its treatment of the Polish minority now and during World War II are subject to continuing negotiations.

It's unclear if this key difference will change.

Both have an interest in revival and development of regional groupings: the Visegrad Group and Three Seas Initiative that died under Orban.

They aim to develop infrastructure and trade between former Warsaw Pact countries.

At least at this moment, Poland seems to be the beneficiary of the government change in Hungary.

Dr. Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon is a senior research fellow at the Institute of World Politics. She was a strategist, policy adviser and project manager on democratic and economic reforms globally. She's been a scholar at the CSIS. Dr. Cannon is a graduate of Columbia University, where she was an International Fellow and IREX Scholar at Warsaw University, and the London School of Economics. Read more Dr. Swiatkowski Cannon Insider articles — Click Here Now.