A stark warning from political scientist Robert Pape is gaining attention among policymakers and market observers: Within 10 days, the global economy will begin experiencing not just higher prices, but outright shortages of critical goods — throwing the world into shock.

In a recent Substack column, Pape, a University of Chicago professor who specializes in national security, argues that most analysis is dangerously outdated, still treating the crisis as a price shock rather than what he describes as a rapidly unfolding "physical constraint" on the global system.

At the center of the crisis is the disruption of flows through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most important energy chokepoints.

Roughly 20% of global oil supply and up to a quarter of liquefied natural gas exports pass through this corridor each day.

But Pape emphasizes that the real danger lies not simply in lost fuel, but in the cascading loss of industrial inputs that underpin modern economies.

What moves through Hormuz, he notes, includes not only crude oil but also refined fuels, petrochemical feedstocks like naphtha, and natural gas used to produce fertilizers.

These materials are foundational to industries ranging from agriculture to pharmaceuticals to electronics.

When shipments slow dramatically, the impact ripples far beyond energy markets.

According to Pape, the global economy is entering a predictable three-stage pattern seen in past blockades and sanctions regimes.

First comes a price spike as markets react to uncertainty.

Next comes the more dangerous phase: physical shortages, as reserves are depleted and supply chains fail to adjust.

Finally, governments step in to ration scarce resources, determining which industries survive and which are forced to shut down.

"The constraint is not reserves in the ground," Pape writes.

"It is the absence of replacement capacity in the system."

This distinction is critical.

While some countries maintain strategic reserves, these are designed to buffer short-term disruptions, not sustained supply losses on the scale now emerging.

Global spare production capacity, estimated at 3 to 5 million barrels per day, is insufficient to offset a prolonged disruption of Hormuz flows, which typically account for 18 to 20 million barrels daily.

The consequences are already beginning to surface.

Several countries in Asia and beyond have introduced emergency measures, including shortened workweeks and fuel-saving policies.

These early interventions reflect mounting pressure as energy supplies tighten and governments attempt to conserve dwindling resources.

Asia, which relies heavily on Gulf energy imports, is expected to bear the initial brunt.

Within weeks, Pape predicts refinery slowdowns, petrochemical shutdowns, and contractions in manufacturing sectors such as plastics, textiles, and electronics.

As these disruptions spread, global supply chains, already tightly synchronized, could begin to fracture.

Europe is likely to follow.

As Asian buyers scramble for alternative energy sources, European markets may face both rising prices and declining availability, particularly in natural gas.

Energy-intensive industries such as chemicals and metals could see production cuts, raising the risk of a broader industrial slowdown.

The United States, while more insulated due to domestic energy production, is not immune.

Pape warns that indirect effects will mount as global trade contracts.

Tightening diesel supplies could increase transportation costs, while delays in imported goods, from machinery to consumer electronics, may disrupt domestic manufacturing and retail.

The broader implication is a shift in how economic crises unfold.

In typical market disruptions, higher prices eventually restore balance by curbing demand or encouraging new supply.

But in a system constrained by physical limits and lacking spare capacity, that mechanism breaks down.

Access, not price, becomes the defining factor.

This shift carries profound policy implications.

Governments may soon face difficult decisions about allocating scarce resources, prioritizing essential sectors, and managing public expectations amid visible shortages.

Such interventions, while necessary, often deepen economic distortions and accelerate contraction.

Looking ahead, Pape identifies several indicators to watch: actual shipping volumes through Hormuz, refinery utilization rates in Asia, and the spread of government rationing measures.

Together, these signals will reveal whether the crisis stabilizes or escalates into a broader systemic shock.

For now, his central message is clear: The world is not simply facing another oil crisis.

It is entering a period in which the availability of essential inputs, not their cost, could determine economic outcomes.

And by the time shortages dominate headlines, the downturn may already be well underway.