OPINION
Just days into the war with Iran, much of the country's top clerical and security leadership is dead, and the political transition process remains opaque.
Yet even as the fighting continues, Tehran is already signaling interest in resuming negotiations.
If Iran is serious about ending the conflict, the preconditions must be clear: an end to support for its proxy networks, significant limits on its ballistic missile and drone arsenals, and the termination of its nuclear program.
These are not issues to be traded away at the negotiating table. The United States should not return to talks without prior agreement on these core demands.
Many observers are watching for signs of a popular uprising from a population weary of a regime that has killed its own citizens, drained national wealth to fund revolutionary adventurism, and earned pariah status through violence at home and abroad.
For these Iranians, the goal is a transition to representative government.
Whether such leadership would emerge organically from civil society or through the return of expatriates such as Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi remains unclear.
Others expect something different: a "Regime 2.0" — cosmetically moderate, perhaps, but still committed to the ideological foundations of the 1979 revolution.
The United States must be prepared for either outcome.
Recent history offers instructive examples:
On Dec. 20, 2024, a small delegation from President Joe Biden's State Department entered post-Assad Damascus to meet with Ahmed al-Sharaa — formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani — Syria's de facto leader.
For over a decade, he had been a senior figure in multiple designated terrorist organizations and carried a $10 million U.S. bounty.
Just over one year later, the de jure president of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro was taken into custody, and leadership in Venezuela passed to Delcy Rodríguez — the daughter of a Marxist guerrilla, a lifelong Chavista, and a staunch defender of Maduro.
She described Maduro as the victim of a "barbaric kidnapping" and the country's "rightful leader."
This means she is no natural ally of the United States.
Yet relations with both Syria and Venezuela are, for now cooperative and productive.
Al-Sharaa's bounty was lifted.
Rodríguez was described as a "friend and partner" during the 2026 State of the Union address. These cases demonstrate an uncomfortable reality: longtime adversaries do not suddenly become allies — but that may not matter.
If a new government is willing to accommodate core American interests, that may be sufficient.
In Iran, however, the status quo — or something worse — may remain in power.
A U.S.–Israeli intervention was clearly contemplated, and succession plans are already in motion. President Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Mohseni-Eje’i, Interim Supreme Leader Arafi, and Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf have reportedly formed a Provisional Leadership Council to maintain continuity until the Assembly of Experts selects the next Supreme Leader.
Against this uncertain transition, the war continues.
Foreign Minister Araghchi has already floated the possibility of renewed diplomatic talks. But this is a poisoned chalice.
Iran's leaders are shrewd.
They understand President Trump's affinity for dealmaking and may hope that a ceasefire creates an opportunity to reset negotiations.
They will sit down at the table as though nothing has happened — offering no more than what was on the table last week.
And if Washington refuses, Tehran will tell the world: "We wanted peace talks. America just wants war."
One hopes the administration will not fall into that trap, though recent reporting about presidential outreach suggests that risk remains.
Past negotiations provide cautionary lessons.
During both the recent talks and the earlier JCPOA discussions under President Barack Obama, Iran successfully extracted significant concessions.
The United States agreed to defer discussions about ending support for Tehran's destabilizing proxy networks.
Iran also secured the removal of its ballistic missile program from the core negotiating framework — even though those missiles pose an existential threat to the region and, increasingly, to the United States itself.
There is room for negotiation — but only after core security issues are resolved. Sanctions relief, accountability for those who killed peaceful protesters, human rights commitments, economic reconstruction assistance, and cooperation on Iran’s severe water crisis could all be addressed at the table.
But before any of that — and before the war ends — the termination conditions must be explicit: no nuclear weapons program, no proxy militias, and sharply reduced missile and drone capabilities.
We can hope for a genuinely moderate government committed to pluralism and an end to nearly five decades of fanaticism and repression.
But such an outcome is unlikely to materialize either spontaneously or by reinstalling expatriate leadership.
The president has made clear that he is not seeking regime change, though he has left open the possibility of governmental transformation.
That distinction matters.
What cannot be accepted is a "Regime 2.0" — a government backed by security forces loyal to the revolutionary ideology.
Such a regime would almost certainly intensify repression, imprison or kill more protesters, and race toward nuclear capability, whether through reconstruction of its domestic program or acquisition abroad.
Iranian leaders have studied North Korea and drawn the same conclusion: nuclear deterrence is the ultimate insurance policy against foreign intervention.
Syria and Venezuela offer a template for war termination.
Set aside secondary ambitions and focus on essentials. Don't demand friendship or ideological alignment.
Demand compliance with core American security interests, backed by the credible threat of continued conflict.
It's an imperfect strategy.
But it has worked, at least for now, in Syria and Venezuela.
It may be worth attempting in Iran.
Brig. Gen. Mark T. Kimmit (USA) ret., served as the 16th assistant secretary of state for Political-Military Affairs under U.S. President George W. Bush (Aug. 2008 - Jan. 2009). Prior to joining the U.S. State Department, he was a brigadier general in the U.S. Army and served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Mideast.