Presidential and parliamentary elections take place in Turkey this Sunday and an economy languishing for the past several years may help spell the end of the road for the republic’s most consequential leader since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

After more than 20 years in power, presidential polls give a slight edge to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s principal challenger, 74-year old Kemal Kilicdaroglu, although most also point toward the necessity of a runoff election at month’s end.

Regardless of the outcome of the country’s elections, however, several key issues bedeviling relations today are likely to remain sticking points for the foreseeable future.

Turkey, bordering Syria, Iran, and Iraq to its south, and Russia and Ukraine via the Black Sea to its north, has been an American strategic ally since sending thousands of its soldiers to fight alongside American GIs during the Korean War and joining NATO in 1952, but the two nations have had their fair share of differences this century, starting with George W. Bush administration’s decision to oust Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and occupy the country.

The relationship has been increasingly turbulent since the end of Barack Obama’s first presidential term. Both sides have had other legitimate beefs.

In addition to Iraq, they include: American policy makers didn't fully appreciate that the Obama administration advanced the interests of the Iranians and a Kurdish militia in Syria the State Department still considers a terrorist entity over Turkey during the bloody civil war, and later offered milquetoast backing to Erdogan after a failed coup attempt in 2016.

Meanwhile, Turkish officials were painfully slow to understand the Trump White House wasn’t looking the other way when they purchased and subsequently took delivery of the Russian S-400 anti-missile defense system and that the incarceration of an American clergyman who had been living in Anatolia for more than 20 years horrified Christian leaders, as well as then-Vice President Mike Pence and then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has given American critics further ammunition against Turkey, in no small part because Erdogan refused to go along with Western sanctions on the Kremlin.

Nonetheless, Turkey has supplied Ukraine with drones that played a pivotal role in the early months of the war and Erdogan brokered a wheat export deal between the two sides, thereby allowing the desperately needed commodity to reach global markets.

Speaking to a reporter with The Wall Street Journal in recent days, Kilicdaroglu assured readers of closer ties to NATO — presumably referring both to Swedish efforts to join the alliance and joining in on sanctions against Russia — and resuscitating his country’s EU membership application.

In an earlier interview with Nikkei Asia, however, Kilicdaroglu described a foreign policy vision that, on a macro level, didn’t seem too far removed from Erdogan’s positions, "It would not be correct to restrict Turkey’s foreign policy to a definition of being pro-East or pro-West. . .  [W]e are a member of Western institutions and organizations, but Turkey has never neglected the East despite being a member of these institutions."

In a not-entirely subtle hint that he might not completely upset Erdogan’s balancing act between Russia and Ukraine, Kilicdaroglu told Nikkei Asia, "It would not be correct to restrict Turkey’s foreign policy to a definition of being pro-East or pro-West."

Such comments ought to surprise no one, as other actors across the globe have recognized the transition from American global dominance to the emergence of a multipolar world and wish to keep all options on the table.

For example, Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman earlier this spring signed a Chinese-brokered normalization agreement with the Iranian regime, even as the kingdom inches toward another normalization deal with Israel. The Crown Prince’s pivot caught the Biden administration napping and is now rushing to play catch-up.

Accordingly, Washington should neither be bullish nor bearish on a Kilicdaroglu presidency vis-a-vis American regional interests but instead prepare to offer meaningful incentives for closer cooperation with Ankara to whomever emerges victorious in a fairly decided election.

For example, it’s difficult to imagine either Erdogan or Kilicdaroglu aligning more closely with America on Russia-Ukraine unless the White House first convinces Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman and longtime anti-Turkey scold Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., to drop his opposition on a pending F-16 military jet sale.

On Syria, the United States should not expect meaningful cooperation from a Turkish government until collaboration with the Kurdish terrorist group affiliate is markedly curtailed.

Meanwhile, the several million Syrian refugees still living in Turkey continue will require repatriation one day in the not too distant future but doing so may require a normalization deal with dictator Bashar Assad, a possibility the United States strongly disfavors.

A gesture to boost two-way trade would be meaningful too, such as a pause or reduction on Turkish steel tariffs.

America’s longtime strategic partners ought not be left to their own devices in the increasingly multipolar universe.

The Biden administration, 2024 presidential challengers, Congress, and the think tank set alike ought to better appreciate Turkey’s value as an indispensable ally and act accordingly.

Jason Epstein is president of Southfive Strategies, LLC, an international public affairs consultancy. Adinda Khaerani is an international relations specialist/researcher.