OPINION

When NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte lands in Washington for his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday, the question will not be how to strengthen the alliance — but whether the U.S. should continue to carry it at all.

Washington is no longer asking whether the alliance is valuable in theory, but whether it delivers in practice.

U.S. President Donald Trump is on firm constitutional ground in reassessing U.S. membership in NATO.

Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, treaty withdrawal authority rests with the presidency, and the 2023 Kaine-Rubio provision does not clearly override it.

The legal argument is not seriously in dispute.

The strategic one is.

In Washington, NATO is no longer a commitment.

It's a line item — and is being questioned.

The starting point is operational reality.

No longer an alliance debate, it's now a cost-benefit test.

When NATO requires execution, the US delivers. When the U.S. asks for alignment—especially beyond Europe — Europe responds unevenly.

Ukraine made that visible, and the Iran conflict is now reinforcing it in real time.

The Iran conflict is exposing limits not of capability, but of political alignment and access.

The United Kingdom and France have signaled limits on support, including potential constraints on how airspace and NATO-linked bases may be used for U.S. operations tied to Iran, demonstrating that access to infrastructure largely funded and enabled by the United States is now politically conditional rather than guaranteed.

When Russia invaded, NATO required speed, scale, and coordination.

The U.S. supplied all three.

Tens of thousands of troops moved into Eastern Europe within weeks, reinforcing Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states at a pace no European military could match.

Washington became the principal supplier of advanced weapons, munitions and air defense, while building the logistics network required to sustain them.

U.S. intelligence was opened and integrated, delivering real-time surveillance and targeting across allied operations.

Washington also led the financial campaign, using sanctions and the dollar-based system—alongside European partners — to isolate Russia from global markets.

That was not burden-sharing.

That was American leadership making the alliance work.

The same structure holds across NATO.

The US built and operates missile defense architecture in Romania and Poland that forms a central layer of Europe’s protection.

The US provides decisive combat power on the eastern flank, including high-readiness formations and armored capability that give deterrence meaning.

Strategic mobility — airlift, logistics and prepositioned equipment — remains overwhelmingly American.

Without it, NATO does not move at speed.

The alliance's intelligence, surveillance, and command backbone is likewise US-led, enabling real operational integration.

The dependency extends further. NATO air policing relies heavily on U.S. aircraft and operational support.

The alliance's ultimate deterrent remains the American nuclear umbrella. Washington has driven NATO modernization in cyber defense, readiness and command reform.

High-end naval capability that secures Atlantic sea lanes and underpins European trade flows is also largely American.

Across every category, deterrence, mobility, intelligence, command — the structure is consistent.

NATO defines requirements. The U.S. delivers outcomes.

Trump Already Forced Change Once—Now He's Raising the Price

This imbalance is not new — but has been forced into the open before.

During his first term, Trump forced enforcement of NATO's 2% defense spending benchmark, particularly at the 2018 Brussels Summit, turning what had been a political guideline into a test of credibility.

Under sustained U.S. pressure, several allies accelerated defense spending, and others made public commitments to comply. Yet major economies, including Germany and Italy, lagged for years and only moved under pressure.

What is different now is the escalation. Trump has signaled that even 2 per cent may no longer be sufficient, raising — politically if not formally — the prospect of a far higher threshold, closer to 5% of GDP.

There is no NATO agreement at 5%.

No member state has accepted it, no timetable exists, and no major European economy comes close to meeting it. Even the strongest contributors — Poland and the Baltic states — remain well below that level.

The 5% figure is not a policy target. It is a pressure mechanism—shifting the debate from incremental burden-sharing to a fundamental question of who pays for European security.

The signal is clear: the question is no longer whether Europe meets minimum commitments, but whether the U.S. should continue underwriting European security at all.

Reverse the direction and the imbalance sharpens further.

The U.S. has pressed for alignment on China, yet France and Germany continue to priorities commercial exposure.

The U.S. warned against dependence on Russian energy, yet Europe proceeded until crisis forced reversal.

American companies face regulatory constraints across European markets — from digital taxation to data rules and competition policy — including in the United Kingdom, where alignment remains incomplete.

Requests from Washington for broader engagement beyond Europe have met limited response.

That is the asymmetry at the core of NATO. The alliance depends on U.S. capacity but does not consistently align with U.S. priorities.

Markets will react long before politicians do.

For Business Leaders in the UK and Across the EU, This Is Not Theoretical

NATO is embedded in Europe's financial architecture. It supports confidence in the wider European risk environment. Markets will adjust before policy does.

The UK will feel this immediately.

London's position as a global financial center is tied to a U.S.-anchored security system.

The EU faces a deeper structural test.

Strategic autonomy has been discussed for years but not funded.

A U.S. recalibration forces that decision now, with direct consequences for fiscal policy, industrial capacity and long-term growth.

This is the environment into which Rutte is walking.

Following the Iran conflict, the Trump administration is not treating NATO as a diplomatic constant. NATO is being treated as a strategic asset under review.

And the Iran conflict has made the access question explicit.

France has stated that NATO serves Euro-Atlantic defense, not offensive missions tied to Iran, effectively restricting how its airspace and supporting infrastructure can be used.

The United Kingdom, while more cautious, has signaled conditional alignment, reinforcing that U.S. use of allied airspace and NATO-linked bases is no longer guaranteed in practice.

For Europe, consequences will concentrate quickly in borrowing costs, capital direction, and currency stability.

Higher defense spending will strain sovereign balance sheets, push yields higher, and widen spreads. Investment will rotate towards defense and energy security, while policy-sensitive sectors reprice.

Currency markets will adjust as security guarantees weaken and risk premiums rise.

For U.S. Business Leaders, Effects Move Through a Different Channel

Defense and industrial sectors stand to gain as European demand shifts towards U.S. systems and supply chains.

At the same time, U.S. multinationals face a more fragmented European market, with greater regulatory friction and political resistance.

Capital flows may tilt further towards U.S. markets, strengthening the dollar while tightening conditions for American exporters competing abroad.

The issue is no longer whether NATO remains desirable.

The question is whether the U.S. continues to fund a system that delivers less alignment, less control and less return than it once did — and whether Europe is prepared for the moment Washington decides it will not.

Richard Torrenzano is chief executive of The Torrenzano Group which helps organization takes control of how they are perceived™. For nearly a decade, he was a member of the New York Stock Exchange management (policy) and Executive (operations) committees. He is a sought-after expert and leading commentator on brands, crisis, media, reputation, financial markets; AI, cyber and digital attacks.